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ST. VLADIMIR'S SEMINARY LIBRAE 
575 SCARSDALE ROAD 
CRESTWOOD, TUCKAHOE, NY 1Γ 
T H E PROBLEM OF LIBERAL OR*HODOXY 
I N RUSSIA, 1905* 
Paul R. Valliere 
By the problem of Liberal Orthodoxy we mean a particular 
instance of the all-European and, indeed, worldwide problem of 
the adjustment of living religious traditions to a dynamic and distinct 
modern culture claiming, in greater or lesser degree, spiritual and 
practical autonomy in the direction of human affairs. The great 
revolutions of modern times, of which the Russian Revolution of 
1905 is one, are particular instances of the advancing of this claim 
of autonomy. Liberal Orthodoxy is any Orthodoxy in modern times 
which envisages at least some opportunities for constructive and 
cooperative relationships with the forces of this modern culture; 
the opposite is an Orthodoxy that looks at modernity with indif­
ference or as a manifest stronghold of Satan and his angels upon 
which the true Church is called to make holy war in the name of 
traditional values. 
The ambiguities of this general characterization of Liberal 
Orthodoxy are patent in the very terms employed. In a Western 
European or American context the terms "liberal" and "Orthodox" 
would often be taken as indicating opposites; confusion would 
arise from the attempt to link them together in a single concept. 
The unfortunate coincidence whereby the Eastern Christian tradition 
is named by a word which to Western liberal minds indicates the 
opposite of everything "liberal" has tended to encourage scepticism 
in the West about whether there has been or ever could be a 
"liberal" type of Orthodoxy. There is nonetheless a long and 
•Presented at a meeting of the American Association of Advanced Slavic 
Studies, Atlanta, October 10, 1975. 
[115] 
complex history of religious change in Russia from the eighteenth 
century to the present day which has been generated by the tension 
between liberal and neotraditionalist tendencies within one and the 
same historical Russian Orthodoxy. The fact that this phenomenon 
has been little studied and less understood hardly argues against its 
existence. One may, on the other hand, justifiably express curiosity 
as to the reasons for this paucity of attention. 
We suggest at least two. One is that as a practical matter 
twentieth-century scholarship on Russia which touches at all upon 
religious matters—and that is but a small part of the scholarship-
has rarely delved into the very core of religious tradition in the 
attempt to expose its logic and directions; it has rather tended to 
involve investigations of religion that are ancillary to some other 
and prior task. For all that has been done in the investigation of 
such matters as the relations of Church and State, the role of 
religious institutions in the government of the Russian Empire, 
and on religious participation as a factor of social history, there 
has been little analysis of the actual religious thought, the modes of 
religious experience, and the forms of piety in modern Russia.1 
Furthermore, what discussion there has been of these matters 
has often proceeded within the framework of Eastern Orthodox 
confessionalism which, while rich in certain kinds of results, is poor 
in others. Above all it is poor in the kind of results sought by the 
discipline of comparative religion, which in the present instance 
would try to sort out the dynamics of Russian religious life in the 
context of the worldwide process of the adjustment of living 
religious systems to modernity. This is a process which we have 
hardly begun to understand in any context. The problem is all 
the more severe with respect to Russia because of the relative 
absence of practitioners of comparative religion from the Russian 
field. 
1John Shelton Curtiss' statement in the preface to Church and State in 
Russia: The Last Years of the Empire 1900-1917 (New York, 1940) is typical: 
" . . . the book does not discuss the theological system or creed of any of the 
religious denominations, and no attempt has been made to discuss the moral 
precepts and teachings of the Orthodox Church or of other religious bodies-
other than those precepts that related specifically to the State and the duties 
of the subject to the government" (p. viii). In the same regard note Hugh 
Seton-Watson's comment in the preface to The Russian Empire: 1801-
1917 (Oxford, 1967): "The history of the Church and of religious ideas re-
mains virtually untouched. This is a field of immense importance, of which 
with deep regret I confess my ignorance, while expressing the hope that 
pioneers will soon appear" (p. xi). 
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All of these practical deficiencies to a large extent probably are 
related to another sort of deficiency which is perhaps the root reason 
for the minimum of attention directed at the core of Russian 
religious tradition; the lack of a general conceptual framework to 
inspire and guide analysis. The reason that so few scholars seriously 
investigate the actual religious thought, modes of religious experi-
ence, and forms of piety of modern Russian religion, we are 
suggesting, is that few scholars know what to do with these human 
products, how even to begin to make sense of them, what categories 
of thought to apply to them, and toward what conceivable ends 
an investigation of them would be directed. Some scholars rec-
ognize this situation. Less aware practitioners opt for some drastic 
oversimplification of the religious situation of modern Russia as a 
surrogate for a genuine conceptual structure. The dualistic equation 
of Orthodoxy with "conservatism" (whatever that word means) 
and of liberalism with "secularism" (whatever that word means) 
is an example of such a surrogate, although it can be maintained 
only by denying either the reality or the significance of the evidence 
of religious change and religious tension within historical Russian 
Orthodoxy. 
To be sure, to call for a "conceptual framework" for investigating 
a subject as vast as religion in modern Russia is to put in a very 
big order, and it is not implied here that meaningful responses 
can be drafted readily. The most that we are doing in the present 
instance is making some suggestions toward a conceptuality for 
thinking about phenomena identifiable as liberal or modernist 
tendencies within Russian Orthodoxy. There are many other prob-
lems, some more important than this one. We would risk one 
generalization, however, and argue that until progress is made in 
working out conceptual structures for the study of religion in 
Russia, a host of questions of broader scope will not be handled 
satisfactorily: E.g., what is "unique," and what generally human 
or "modern" about Russia's cultural course in modern times? What 
are the dominant formative of Russian Orthodoxy as possibly 
distinct from and even obscured by the forces which had the 
greatest political importance? What impact did the Orthodox 
tradition have, or not have, on the thought and piety of the Russian 
intelligentsia, or of other groups that constituted Russian society? 
What does Russian Orthodoxy have in common, or not in common, 
with the other branches of Eastern Orthodoxy in its adjustment to 
modernity and its local social and cultural role? What themes or 
motives in Orthodoxy might play a dynamic role in Russian culture 
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even today? In terms of the subject of the present paper, a question 
on the order of the preceding may be posed about Russian liberalism: 
What were, or are, the special problems, potentialities, and dynamics 
of Russian liberalism which may in some degree be connected 
with Russian religious thought and practice? 
We may return, then, to working out a conceptual structure 
in support of the term, "Liberal Orthodoxy." 
"Liberal Orthodoxy" 
To speak of "Liberal Protestantism," "Liberal Catholicism," 
or simply "liberal religion" has been commonplace in Western 
religious discussion for over a century. Theological liberalism loosely 
means any sort of modernism, reformism, or anti-fundamentalism 
practiced by one of the historic confessions. This usage is merely 
extended in the case of "Liberal Orthodoxy." The ambiguity of 
course lies in the inevitable socio-political frame of reference of 
the term "liberal." The question immediately arises: are we, in 
speaking about Liberal Orthodoxy, or about any other sort of 
Liberal religion, to assume that it is connected with or implies 
political liberalism? 
It is tempting to think so. At some advanced point in the 
historical dialectic it may even be so. But for three reasons relevant 
to the present discussion this assumption will not be made. It will 
not be made first because there is plenty of evidence that the 
connection between theological and political liberalism is by no 
means clear or direct. One of the most striking examples of this 
to be found in the period of 1905 in Russia is the work of Bishop, 
later Metropolitan Antonii (Khrapovitskii), who as bishop of 
Volhynia in 1905 emerged as one of the leaders of extreme reac-
tionary politics on the Russian Church scene, yet whose theological 
essays, surprisingly, show the influence of Western European liberal 
theology and represent a consequential effort at theological innova-
tion.2 
2See Mitropolit Antonii, Nravstvennyi smysl osnovnykh khristianskikh 
dogmatov (second ed. Moscow, 1917). My own explanation of the seeming 
paradox here is that there was actually a common term between AntoniFs 
attempt to bring dogma to life as expressive of "moral" ideas (a liberal theolog-
ical interpretation) and his attempt to mobilize the Church by means of the 
agencies of an autocratic episcopate and the Orthodox mob. That common 
term was the idea of the independence of the Church, of a morally activist 
and effective Church Militant. 
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Second, the assumption of a direct connection between theological 
and political liberalism will not be made because it is a matter that 
requires systematic discussion in its own right. The focus here, 
however, is on the concept of theological liberalism; and clearly 
the latter deserves some attention before the broader question of 
religion and liberal politics can be properly handled. 
Third, the assumption will not be made because of the main 
proposition which this paper is intended to advance: that the problem 
of Liberal Orthodoxy in Russia in 1905 was not essentially or 
even mainly a political problem, that is to say a problem mainly 
of the relationship between religion and the State. It was a problem 
of tradition and modernity, of religion and modern culture; ulti-
mately, a theological problem, a problem of theology of culture. 
We will proceed to this proposition first by offering a brief 
abstract definition of theological liberalism; then by looking at 
some concrete manifestations of Liberal Orthodoxy in Russia in 
1905; and finally going to the heart of the theological problem by 
considering the discussion of dogma that was going on in the Rus-
sian Church in 1905. 
Theological liberalism is defined here in terms of its two 
essential pursuits, both of which have to do with the exercise of 
"freedom," as I suppose any "liberalism" always must. The two 
pursuits are: the freedom of tradition and the freedom of involve-
ment in culture. Freedom of tradition, quite different from freedom 
from tradition, is the liberty of a religion to be and reflect upon 
itself, to explore its own lights without such constraints within or 
without as would make an on-going process of reflection impossible. 
The work of the Russian Bible Society and the rise of academies 
dedicated to independent theological scholarship in nineteenth-
century Russia are manifestations of this freedom. The agitation 
for a Sobor in 1905 and thereafter is another. The second freedom, 
freedom of involvement in culture, is typical of the practical side 
of theological liberalism. By it a religious community defines its 
relationship to culture neither as ascetical flight nor magisterial 
domination, but as meeting and mutual interpretation. Theologically 
this implies a vision which sees the freedom of the children of God 
somehow implicated in and illuminating the freedom of the sons 
and daughters of humankind in the world in which they live. 
Examples of the exercise of this freedom in modern Russia would 
be the work of missionaries such as Ilminskii, organizer of Tartar 
schools, as well as the social agitation of activist priests of the 
1905 era such as Petrov and Gapon. 
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The two freedoms in which theological liberalism is rooted ac-
quire a special cruciality in situations where traditional religion 
meets modernity. The dynamism and apparent autonomy of the 
modernizing forces of culture so radically alter the historical con-
text in which a religious tradition exists that the latter has to engage 
in an enterprise of self-interpretation if it is not to be overwhelmed; 
and this enterprise can take place only on the condition of an 
effective freedom of tradition. Furthermore, since the vigor of 
modern culture ensures the impossibility of domination by any 
religious tradition and, at the same time, offers a multitude of 
charms to which many individuals and institutions have a hard 
time saying "no," the way of involvement in culture, as opposed 
to withdrawal or domination, will exercise a definite attraction 
under modern conditions—but again, only on the condition that 
the individuals and institutions concerned are in some fundamental, 
perhaps spiritual, sense "free" to become involved. 
The possibility of Liberal Orthodoxy depended upon exercising 
these two freedoms in some degree. The problem of Liberal Ortho-
doxy was also connected with them; it lay in discovering what 
ultimately was to be made of these two freedoms once they existed 
in whatever degree—what they could do and what could be done 
with them in Russia in 1905. 
"Liberal Orthodoxy" at Moscow Theological Academy in 1905 
Manifestations of Liberal Orthodoxy as we have defined it were 
legion during the first decade of the twentieth century in Russia and 
are not easily characterized in summary fashion. For purposes of 
creating a compact impression, we invite acceptance of the conve-
nient fiction of a recreated picture of what it was like being a Liberal 
Orthodox student in the Moscow Theological Academy during the 
years 1904-1907. The picture would be much the same if drawn for 
one of the other three theological academies. In all of these cases 
what the picture would reflect is the reality of the Revolution as ex-
perienced by the intellectual elite of the Russian Orthodox Establish-
ment and, to some extent, the elite of the episcopate as well. The 
limitation of the picture is obviously that it can hardly be thought to 
describe the Russian Church as a whole, least of all at the popular 
level. The virtue is that it represents a body of people that had much 
of the responsibility for the leadership of the Orthodox confession in 
Russia, and a group that was genuinely concerned in all its activities 
[ 1 2 0 ] 
with Orthodoxy as a religious system, with Orthodoxy as Orthodoxy 
—something that could not be assumed were we talking about the 
lower seminaries, for example, where the groups involved were much 
more diverse and engaged in a multitude of purposes not necessarily 
related at all to Orthodoxy or even to religion. 
As a member of the Moscow Academy, you would have attended 
the opening exercises of the academic year 1904-1905 in September, 
1904, and heard an address by the Rector, Bishop Evdokim (Me-
shcherskii). In that lecture the bishop would have asked you to 
choose as your models of academic life Sts. Gregory and Basil, who 
"live right [in Athens] in the noisy center of the pagans, in a whirl-
pool of various currents and tendencies," but nevertheless devote 
themselves to nothing but the spirituality of the Church and the pur-
suit of learning; or again, "the ancient school of the Pythagoreans," 
in which the students "by the strictness of their life in part remind us 
of monks and by their love of wisdom, the outstanding individuals of 
both ancient and modern times"; and finally, Oxford University, 
where Evdokim would assure you (quoting Khomiakov) that "uni-
versity discipline resembles the monastic, students' pastimes still com-
pletely bear the character of children's games," and yet whence "the 
powerful and daring minds" of modern industrial England somehow 
miraculously emerge.3 
The events of 1904-1905, of course, would have made it difficult 
for you to cultivate the life-style urged by Bishop Evdokim. In Sep-
tember of 1905 at the beginning of another academic year, you would 
have heard of the boycott of the annual academic convocation by the 
students of the Kiev Theological Academy protesting "the political 
and social situation of the country." Two weeks later you would have 
joined with students of the other three theological academies in pub-
lishing resolutions "not to attend classes until such time as the acade-
mies are given autonomy" and drafting statements as to just what 
"autonomy" meant.4 In general it meant the governance of the theo-
logical academies by the Academic Council of each academy, the 
composition and control of the Council thereby becoming very hot 
issues. Above all autonomy meant freedom from the interference of 
bishops and Synod bureaucrats. At the Moscow Academy you would 
sArkhiepiskop Evdokim, Dobroe proshloe imperatorskoi Moskovskoi 
Dukhovnoi Akademii (K stoletnemu iubileiu Akademii), Po tserkovnym-
obschchestvennym voprosam, Vol. Ill (Sergiev Posad, 1915), pp. 15-19. 
4
"God bor'by za avtonomiiu dukhovnykh akademii," Tserkovno-obshehest-
vennaia zhizn' (Kazan), 1907, No. 2, cols. 52-53. 
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have had to deal with a particularly "bad" bishop in Metropolitan 
Vladimir of Moscow, who was unalterably opposed to all of your 
desires. In the middle of the nation-wide rail strike in October, 1905, 
he would lock you and your fellows out of the dormitories of the 
Academy even though the conditions of the strike made it impossible 
for you to go home. You would have been comforted, however, by 
hearing about a particularly violent meeting of the Academic Council, 
attended by the metropolitan, during which he and the professors had 
it out with each other. In fact most of the professors would have been 
to some extent on your side. In November they would send a delega-
tion to the Holy Synod in Petersburg to work out provisional rules of 
academic governance. The rules which resulted would have left you 
disappointed, for in spite of the majority of the professors' support 
for opening the rectorship of the academies to any qualified individu-
al, clerical or lay, the provisional rules still prescribed a clerical 
rector. It would have been an improvement, however, that this indi-
vidual was now to be chosen by a council of faculty in which even 
docents could participate.5 For a full and permanent adjudication of 
the issue of autonomy, though, you would now have to look forward 
to the speedy calling of a national Sobor of the Russian Orthodox 
Church, where the specific issue of academic autonomy would be 
discussed in the far broader context of the question of the freedom 
of the Church itself. 
As the issue of the freedom of the Church was unfolding in the 
direction of the calling of a Sobor, you would have had in the mean-
time many opportunities for involvement in modernist projects of 
study and action in and around the Moscow Academy. Your Rector, 
Bishop Evdokim, had by this time turned from the ideal of quietude 
to that of Christian social action and in the fall of 1906 was busy 
organizing a Pastoral-Educational Brotherhood at the Academy. The 
purpose of the Brotherhood was to provide students with practical 
training in ministry. Activities included preaching in local churches, 
publishing brochures and pamphlets for popular audiences, social 
work among poor people, alcoholics and prisoners, and regular dis-
cussion sessions in which papers by members of the Brotherhood 
were read and discussed. Papers dealt with such subjects as Chris-
tianity and war, the social question, the role of the laity in the 
Church, and the need for a more competent parish clergy. Outside 
visitors sometimes met with the Brotherhood, such as N. N. Nepliuev, 
organizer of the Holy Cross Labor Brotherhood, an agricultural pro-
Hbid.9 No. 2, col. 53; No. 3, cols. 83-85. 
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ducers* and consumers* cooperative about two hundred strong in the 
Glukhov District of the Chernigov Guberniia which had been in ex­
istence since 1893 working out its own type of Christian populism.6 
You might have visited Nepliuev's commune yourself the year before 
in the company of a delegation from the Academy organized by your 
Professor of Moral Theology, Mikhail M. Tareev. 
The Labor Brotherhood was but one of the stops which Professor 
Tareev made during a series of field trips in 1905-1906 to Orthodox 
religious establishments that were engaged in social service of one 
kind or another.7 He presented his findings in the course of an ex­
tracurricular series of lectures on monasticism organized by himself 
and Professors Popov (Patristics) and Smirnov (Church History), a 
series that generated a good deal of hostility among the monks as it 
coincided with student and faculty protests against monastic domi­
nance in the administration of the Academy.8 "Our time is interested 
not in what is happening behind monastery walls, in the solitude of 
the hermitage, in the closet of the ascetic," wrote Tareev, "but in 
what Christianity offers for all aspects of actual life—economic needs, 
social demands, marital life, labor communes, a fraternal social life."9 
He contrasted contemplative absorption in personal salvation with 
the service-oriented activities being pursued in some of the contem­
porary monasteries of Russia, such as convents in the Polish prov­
inces where the humble nursing and educational missions of nuns 
were attempting to undo some of the harm created by generations of 
bureaucrats in the name of Orthodoxy; a monastery in Pechenga on 
the Murmansk shore that provided a modicum of agricultural assist­
ance and social services for the Lapp population; a soup kitchen for 
bosiaki organized by a sister in Novgorod. 
If you were a student interested in broader aspects of such Chris­
tian social action, a large and growing body of what we in the West 
would call Social Gospel literature was available, such as Father 
6Arkhiepiskop Evdokim, "Pastyrsko-prosvetiteFnoe Bratstvo pri Akademii," 
op. cit., pp. 286-319. 
7For Tareev's account of the field trips see Zhivye dushi: ocherk nrav-
stvennykh sii sovremennoi Rossii (third ed.), in Osnovy khristianstva: sistema 
religionznoi my sii, Supplementary Vol. (V): Religionznaia zhizn* (Sergiev 
Posad, 1910). 
8
"Osvobodietrnaia dvizhenie i bor'ba za avtonomiiu ν Moskovskoi Dukho-
vnoi Akademii: Zapiska prof. M. A. Ostroumova," "Stranitsa iz nedavnei 
istorii bogoslovskoi nauki (Reviziia akademii ν 1908 g.)," Bogoslovskii vestnik, 
1917 (June-Dec), pp. 115-116. 
Tareev, op. cit., p. 5. 
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Petrov's Evangelie, kak osnova zhizni. Foreign works were also to be 
had. It is rather startling to see, for example, that one of the key 
books of the American Social Gospel Movement of the Progressive 
Era, Francis Greenwood Peabody's Jesus Christ and the Social Ques-
tion, had come out in Russian translation in 1906.10 If your were in-
terested in the theoretical and theological problems of social Christi-
anity, a literature more sophisticated than this was also at hand, such 
as the discussions of the Religio-Philosophical Meetings of 1901-1903 
in St. Petersburg, the works of "Novoe religioznoe soznanie," and a 
growing number of studies of social thought by your own Orthodox 
theologians. Tareev himself was soon to begin work on a very de-
tailed and competent critique of Marxist socialism which began to 
come out in 1912.11 
To sum up the impression that we have been creating, it may be 
said that in terms of the types of involvement open to you and the 
depth and sophistication of theological discussion going on around 
you, your situation as a liberal Christian in the Moscow Theological 
Academy in 1904-1907 would have had a great deal in common 
with that of the Social Gospel circles and theological modernists in 
Western Europe and America of the same period. The main differ-
ence would be that the political and ecclesiastical constraints on 
your activities would have been much more numerous and effective. 
"Liberal Orthodoxy" as a Theological Problem 
In the light of the definition of theological liberalism and the 
manifestations of Liberal Orthodoxy just considered, we may now 
attempt to spell out the meaning of the proposition that the problem 
of Liberal Orthodoxy in 1905 was not a political problem, but a 
theological one: a problem of theology of culture. 
To put the matter in this way may well cause irritation or con-
fusion. One might wonder whether in urging a leap away from polit-
ical discussion to theology we are not engaging in mystification, 
scowling like Virgil's Sybil—"Procul, o procul este profani!" "Stay 
10Fr. Pibodi, Usus Khristos i sotsiaVnyi voprost trans. S. Nikitskii (Moscow, 
1906). 
n M. M. Tareev, lz istorii etiki: Sotsializm (Nravstvennosf i khoziaistvo), 
Pt. 1: Nauchnyi sotsializm: ego ekonomicheskoe uchenie (Sergiev Posad, 
1913). This work is continued (but not completed) by "Ideologiia sotsializma," 
Bogoslovskii vestnik 1918 (Jan.-Feb.), pp. 39-73; (Mar.-May), pp. 90-113; 
(June-Sept.), pp. 197-231. 
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away you uninitiated!"—and so destroying any possibility of a con-
crete and accessible historical discussion. Or one might judge the 
dualism of our proposition as obviously unstable in the light of what 
has already been said about Liberal Orthodoxy. If Liberal Orthodoxy 
depends upon the exercise of freedom of tradition and freedom of 
cultural involvement, and if the immediate practical constraints on 
both of these in Russia in 1905 were rooted in the Church-State rela-
tionship—which we would not deny—then is it not clear that the 
problem of Liberal Orthodoxy was a political problem par excellence? 
Both these objections may be obviated to some extent by making 
a distinction between the provisional achievements of Liberal Ortho-
doxy as evidenced by the sort of manifestations which we have just 
reviewed, and the content and long-range practical vocation of Lib-
eral Orthodoxy. The real problem, we suggest, is to be located in the 
latter two aspects, which are related. The point here may be adduced 
by thinking again for a moment about Bishop Evdokim, Rector of 
the Moscow Academy in 1905. When the Bishop threw himself into 
the organization of his Pastoral-Educational Brotherhood to pursue 
the aims of "social Christianity," he could be credited with a modest 
achievement of Liberal Orthodoxy. But what if we ask about this 
achievement not the question, "What was Evdokim doing and why?", 
but the question, "What, pray, did Evdokim ultimately have to say 
or to do in Russia during the Revolution of 1905—not have in his 
power, but in his vision, his message, his conception of a direction 
for Russian society?" Without denying that Evdokim might have had 
certain resources for action in response to a very real crisis situation 
in his institution and his society, can we really help wondering what 
he had to say along the lines of "social Christianity" that could really 
help, what spark of charisma he had that could in any way illuminate 
a milieu plunged in the profound pathos of the Revolution of 1905? 
Speaking abstractly again, the question here is about what is 
actually going on in the "adjustment" of a religious tradition to mod-
ernity. So often the process of adjustment is understood in simple 
stereotypical terms as a mutual facing-off between religion and mod-
ern culture through which religious tradition accepts the status of a 
voluntary organization in the pluralistic society and modernity im-
poses certain guidelines to insure against interference by tradition in 
the working of modernizing forces. Liberal religionists go one step 
further within this general framework and find activities which tradi-
tion can pursue to further some of the ends of modern culture and so 
play a socially useful role. But the depth of the problem of tradition 
and modernity is really so much greater than this model suggests. 
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To call it a theological problem is to point to the question of identity 
involved. Religious traditions can certainly be moulded and even 
exploited (not necessarily unjustifiably) in terms of the social and 
political agenda of their milieu. But this is true only up to a certain 
point; at some point the problems of the content of thought and the 
effective forms of piety arise, for every religious tradition has an 
identity, and this cannot be sacrificed without crisis and breakdown. 
Identities can be changed, but scarcely through a process of "adjust-
ment" to external forces pure and simple. Religious identities can be 
changed from within or redirected through fresh religious experience 
that emerges at points of meeting between religion and culture; but 
even these steps forward onto new ground are possible because they 
somehow make sense on the old ground of tradition. The practical 
social aspect of such change is as complex as the theoretical and per-
sonal aspects. It lies not merely in a tradition adjusting to modes of 
social action challenging it from without, but in the participation of 
tradition in the actual creation of modes of social action: that is to 
say, in generating fresh charisma that can shape the social and cul-
tural milieu. 
Viewed in terms of the aspects of identity and long-range prac-
tical vocation, the problem of Liberal Orthodoxy is seen to transcend 
both the question of its sheer possibility and the question of its polit-
ical success or failure. The problem becomes not so much how to 
bring Liberal Orthodoxy, or any other religious modernism, into be-
ing and defend it successfully, as how these efforts find something to 
say and to what extent that adequately meets the measure of the 
pathos of modernity itself—or, for that matter, the pathos of the 
classical religious traditions themselves, with their own peculiar vi-
sions of transcendence. 
The great strength of the St. Petersburg Religio-Philosophical 
Meetings of 1901-1903 lay in the fact that it was in terms of the deep 
aspects of the question of tradition and modernity that discussion 
proceeded, at least in so far as the moving spirits behind the meetings 
were concerned, such as Ternavtsev and Merezhkovsky. In the open-
ing paper of the first of the Religio-Philosophical Meetings, Ternav-
tsev gave an excellent demonstration of the kind of logic that needed 
to be cultivated. His topic was the mutual alienation of the Orthodox 
Church and the secular activist intelligentsia, and his plea was that 
the key to a deep mobilization and reorientation of Russian society 
lay in healing this alienation.12 Throughout the paper he clearly main-
lfV. A. Ternavtsev, "Russkaia tserkov* pred velikoiiu zadachei," Zapiskl 
[126] 
tains that the problem that he is talking about is not a political one, 
in his words, a problem of reconciling "parties." The task he sets be-
fore the Meeting is not the negotiation of détente, or even entente, 
by parties which, because they have to operate in the same political 
arena, need to come to terms with each other as best they can, given 
their respective "interests." He defines both the intelligentsia and the 
Church not as interest- or power-groups, but as groups that embody 
respective moral and religious ideas. The idea of the Church is the 
life-giving revelation of Christ in historical Christian Orthodoxy. The 
intelligentsia embodies "the idea of humanity and the human" which 
is to be realized in "a new system, a new society—spiritualized, where 
there is no division between the ideal and the actual."13 Ternavtsev's 
proposition is that Church and intelligentsia will heal their hate only 
when they see that these two ideas, the Christian revelation and humani-
zation, may stimulate each other and release fresh energies for mutual 
realization and for realizing something else as well, some new thing: 
"obshchestvennoe vo Khriste spasenie" "social salvation in Christ."14 
But for this new scene to be possible what is needed is obviously not 
on the order of a common political program; what is needed is a new 
piety, and "new piety" implies a fresh revelation of God's light. The 
Orthodox Church is challenged by Ternavtsev to see that "in the in-
telligentsia, though it has still not come to Christ, a particular type of 
piety and righteousness is potentially contained and foreshadowed." 
This type of piety will be historically actualized by the Church when 
it discovers "the truth and justice for earth concealed within Chris-
tianity" but long obscured by the Church's age-old "lack of a reli-
gious-social ideal"; and by the intelligentsia when it discovers not the 
utility of a veneer of Christianity ("khristianstvennosf ") but the 
reality of the Living God, thus transcending the pathos of its secular-
ism, its bondage to despair and death.15 This is what Ternavtsev, with 
the sense of expectancy of St. John on Patmos, sees on the spiritual 
horizon of modernity. 
What Ternavtsev has to say about the concrete content and his-
torical forms of this new piety is interesting in its own right and 
obviously crucial to the substance of his own Liberal Orthodoxy, but 
Religiozno-Filosofskikh Sobranii ν S.-Peterburge, I e Sobranie, pp. 8-22. (The 
Zapiski were published as supplements to the montly issues of the journal 
Novyi Puf [St. Petersburg] from January 1903, through January, 1904. Pagina­
tion was consecutive from 1-531.) 
lHbid„ pp. 11-15. 
"Ibid., p. 22. 
lHbid., pp. 16-21. 
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the present occasion prohibits more detailed discussion.16 What is 
important at the moment is to see the shape of the conceptuality be-
ing employed here. 
If one follows and accepts the conceptual analysis of the problem 
of Liberal Orthodoxy up to this point, one will appreciate the cen-
trality and broad relevance of the subject which dominated the last 
16The question of the concrete content of the "new piety" and "new revela-
tion" expected is obviously crucial, particularly in terms of the criteria of 
evaluation to be applied. Who is to say, and on what basis, that this or that 
content or form of action is part of the new piety and the new revelation? 
This question came up often in the Religio-Philosophical Meetings devoted to 
the question of "dogmatic development" (XVIIe-XXe Sobraniia). Here it was 
not only some of the churchmen who wanted clarification but members of the 
intelligentsia as well. Minsky, for example, makes an interesting comment 
on the call for "creativity" in dogmatics by Rozanov and Merezhkovsky. Minsky 
observes that the "right wing" of the Meetings (the conservative churchmen) 
is perfectly explicit and honest about the criteria which it is applying in dis-
cussing dogma: the criterion of "faith" (in the tenets of historical Orthodoxy). 
But as for the "left wing," the innovators, writes Minsky, "I never know in 
just what light it is that they see the present questions that we are examining. 
Sometimes it seems to be in the light of reason, sometimes in the light of 
revelation. Perhaps their point of view will be clarified further. I personally 
see the possibility of dogmatic development only in the sense that we can 
bring religious truth into the light of reason. This light is new free thought" 
(Zapiski, p. 446). What this comment shows is that Minsky did not exactly 
share the conceptuality of the problem of dogmatic development or the view 
of religious consciousness held by Merezhkovsky, Ternavtsev, Rozanov and 
others on the "left wing." Minsky is speaking about the rationalization of 
dogma (and he expects the conservative churchmen to demur). Merezhkovsky 
et al. are speaking about the recharismatization of dogma through fresh 
religious experience. Theirs is the conceptuality which, in the judgment of 
this paper, is adequate to the problem of Liberal Orthodoxy. But to say 
this hardly denies the force of Minsky's criticism: that the criteria of judgment 
here are by no means clear. 
The content of the new piety envisioned by members of the "left wing" 
of the Meetings, in so far as one can see it at all, varied from individual to 
individual. In Ternavtsev's case the preaching of a coming revelation of the 
"truth and justice for earth" hidden deep within the Christian tradition was 
made concrete in a kind of Christian populism that included a positive re-
ligious evaluation of the State, the State being employed and also transfigured 
by a recovered seriousness about the "diaconie" mission of the Church, par-
ticularly in terms of the stewardship of property in Russian society (see 
Zapiskiy pp. 13, 21-22). Here we have an interesting example of the impos-
sibility of making a direct transition from "Liberal Orthodoxy" to what would 
be considered political liberalism in the time and place under discussion. 
Ternavtsev's theological liberalism motivates him to preach a closer union of 
Church and State at a time when greater separation of Church and State was 
one of the most widely held desiderata of Russian political liberalism. 
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four Religio-Philosophical Meetings, the question of "dogmatic de-
velopment."17 That is to say: whether the dogmatic structure of Ortho-
dox Christianity is to be considered complete or still underway; and 
if still underway, then how new creative forces for the building of 
dogma can be released and structured. Merezhkovsky himself was 
the chief instigator and presiding spirit of these discussions, drawing 
friends and enemies from both Orthodox and secular members of the 
Meetings. In his argument that not only is the Christian dogmatic 
system in itself open-ended but that the reality of ever-new religious 
experience—which it is impious to deny—implies the possibility of 
new dogmatic insight and articulateness, Merezhkovsky provides a 
brilliant example of the exercise of a conceptuality adequate to the 
problem of Liberal Orthodoxy as we have stated it. Merezhkovsky's 
performance is no stuffy closet drama or esoteric discipline. It has 
relevance to all of the concrete historical levels of the problem of 
Liberal Orthodoxy: the personal-existential, the doctrinal, and the 
social-institutional. On the existential level the dogmatic task is to 
make a theological evaluation of the ideal of "humanization," and 
this at its deepest point: the meaning of freedom, which Merezhkov-
sky refuses to take for granted either in traditionalist or modern secu-
larist terms. It remains a problem for him, in some ways "the" prob-
lem.18 On the level of theological doctrine as such, the dogmatic task 
is to examine with renewed seriousness and historical imagination the 
Christian doctrine of the Holy Spirit and the Christian expectation of 
the Apocalypse. Why these two themes? Not for arbitrary reasons: 
first, because they are among the themes immediately relevant in a 
theological evaluation of "humanization," since they constitute an 
interpretation of the sanctification and ultimate historical destiny of 
humankind; second and even more obviously—though regularly for-
gotten by churchmen and secularists alike—because the doctrine of 
the Spirit and the expectation of the Apocalypse are inherently un-
17Zapiski, XVIIe-XXe Zasedaniia, pp. 421-531. 
18See Merezhkovsky's remarks on freedom in Zapiski, pp. 187-188. 
Merezhkovsky's problem was that he wanted freedom of conscience and a 
non-coercive Christianity without, however, being willing to accept the re-
ligious "indifferentism" and "atheistic freedom" of the West. But the latter, 
as Kartashev pointed out, were not only well represented but perhaps to some 
extent unavoidable in the modern freedom movement. In a sense Merezhkovsky 
simply had to go on hoping against hope that some illumination, social in 
scope, would transcend the present unacceptable (to him) terms of the prob-
lem of freedom. May we suggest that this means that for Merezhkovsky 
"freedom" was as much a "dogmatic" problem as the more obviously theo-
logical problems of God, the Spirit, the End, etc.? 
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finished theological concepts and when included in the Christian 
dogmatic structure give the whole system an open-ended character, 
so implying the possibility of new revelation and "development." 
Finally, on the social and institutional level the dogmatic task of Lib-
eral Orthodoxy is to convene the Sobor—not the Sobor merely as a 
political exigency or desideratum, but as a spiritual reality witnessing 
to the inner independence of the Christian faith and actualizing the 
power of the mystical Church in a historical presence that could at-
tempt to address the pathos of the Revolution, and of modernity 
itself.19 
To point out the tasks of Liberal Orthodoxy on these various 
levels is not the same thing as to point the way to the execution of 
these tasks. That would require in each case a plunge into questions 
of the content of religious thought and the forms of piety. The identi-
fication of these tasks, however, does provide illustration of the way 
in which the problem of Liberal Orthodoxy is being conceptualized, 
and the suggestion of a conceptual structure is the point of the pres-
ent paper. One might add that the conceptual framework taken as 
exemplary here, even as a sheerly abstract structure, is not without 
its own spiritual dynamism. For one of the most important things 
about the discussion of dogmatic development by Merezhkovsky and 
others was not dependent upon either the content of the discussions 
or on their deemed success or failure. It lay in the mere fact that 
there was a discussion of "dogma" at all, that in Russia on the eve 
and during the Revolution of 1905 there were individuals and groups 
that could be passionately involved in such an enterprise—and not at 
all for neotraditionalist reasons, but for the sake of coming to terms 
with modernity conceived in highly sophisticated and even radical 
19We have not yet investigated Merezhkovsky's views on the expected 
Sobor satisfactorily. The schematization of the "levels" of the dogmatic prob-
lem of Liberal Orthodoxy here is our own analytical construct, including 
what we say therein about the Sobor. But we would argue that our schematiza-
tion is faithful to the spirit and to the conceptual structure of Merezhkovsky's 
vision of a renewed Christianity and represents a valid, if tentative, extension 
of his logic to the concrete institutional problems of the Orthodox Church 
in 1905. Certainly the mystique of a Sobor was powerfully felt by some of 
the members of the Religio-Philosophical Meetings and, to say the obvious, 
we are dealing here with the Sobor as a spiritual reality and not a political 
one. What was found especially attractive was the form of a Sobor (inde-
pendent of the dogmatic content discussed). The form of a Sobor was itself 
seen as a manifestation of the working of the Holy Spirit and a witness to the 
openness of the Church to new revelation. See the comments by S. P. Zorin 
(citing the authority of V. V. Bolotov) in Zapiski, pp. 438-439. 
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terms. This sort of discussion carried its own particular interest and, 
one might say, charisma. And fundamentally speaking it was not the 
simplification, or modernization, or rationalization of dogma that 
Merezhkovsky was seeking either, but rather the recharismatization 
of dogma, which would give it a formative role to play in modern 
culture.20 In the light of this aim, in fact, one could proceed to a fairly 
comprehensive critique of the thought and work of many Russian 
Orthodox Liberals of the period of 1905 who thought about tradition 
and its dogmatic trappings in much the same way as did their secular-
ist friends: that it was in every sense the obstacle and hardly one of 
the resources of Liberal Orthodoxy in the modern world. But this 
critique, just like the discussion of the content of the various visions 
of Liberal Orthodoxy in Russia, must await another occasion. 
20Merezhkovsky was fascinated by what he took to be the social and cultural 
formative power of dogmas, e.g.: "You speak," replies Merezhkovsky to an 
interlocutor, "of the leaven planted by Christ, and we see what a massive 
ferment resulted at the start, how the life then was. Under the influence of 
dogmas whole cultures were put together, everything was subordinated to 
them. It is possible to trace the way dogmas were reflected in all aspects of 
culture. Now once again a moment has come in our consciousness when we 
feel the need to introduce the dogmas into life" (Zapiski, p. 445). 
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